Commission Proposes Overhaul of Consolidated Audit Trail Governance to Enhance Efficiency and Accountability
The Commission has proposed a restructuring of the governance and funding of the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) to improve regulatory efficiency and accountability. The current decentralized governance by self-regulatory organizations (SROs) has led to decision-making delays, disputes, and soaring operational costs projected to reach $250 million by 2024. The proposal includes rescinding Rule 613, replacing the existing NMS plan with a new Commission rule, and funding through Congressional appropriations. This reform aims to align decision-making authority with fiscal responsibility, ensuring regulators can effectively operate the CAT while promoting sustainable governance. The Commission invites public feedback to refine the CAT's structure and functionality for a more accountable and efficient audit trail.

Statement Summary
The Commission has proposed a restructuring of the governance and funding of the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) to enhance regulatory efficiency and accountability. The current decentralized governance by self-regulatory organizations (SROs) has led to prolonged decision-making, disputes, and soaring operational costs, which are projected to reach $250 million by 2024. The proposed changes aim to hold the Commission accountable for its regulatory decisions, with a new rule replacing the existing NMS plan and funding through Congressional appropriations. This reform intends to better align decision-making authority with fiscal responsibility, ensuring that regulators can operate an effective consolidated audit trail while promoting sustainable governance. The Commission encourages feedback on this proposal to improve the CAT's structure and functionality.
Original Statement
Today, the Commission proposes to restructure the governance and funding of the Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”). This proposal represents an important step toward improving regulatory efficiency and accountability by aligning responsibility for the CAT’s governance and funding with responsibility for its oversight and use. As Commissioner Dan Gallagher noted in 2012, the CAT was developed to “provide the Commission with data and other information that is critical to satisfying our statutory missions, and allowing us to oversee the markets in a smart and efficient manner.”
However, the initial decision to establish the CAT through a national market system (“NMS”) plan has had far-reaching consequences. Under the existing framework, the CAT is governed by a committee of self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), each with its own interests, priorities, and responsibilities. This decentralized structure has resulted in protracted decision-making, disputes over governance and funding, and substantial increases in operating costs.
When the CAT NMS plan was approved in 2016, its annual operating costs were estimated at approximately $55 million. By 2024, the projected annual operating budget approached $250 million. Although recent efforts have reduced these expenditures, the magnitude of cost increases has raised serious questions about whether the existing governance structure provides appropriate incentives for fiscal discipline.
The Commission itself has played a significant role in CAT’s rising costs, having established the CAT’s initial reporting framework and subsequently expanded its scope and functionality. Most importantly, Commission staff are among the principal users, if not the primary users, of CAT data and rely on this information to carry out many regulatory functions. Yet the Commission has not borne direct financial responsibility for the costs associated with its regulatory decisions. Instead, those costs have fallen on the SROs, their members, and ultimately, at least in part, investors.
When decision-makers are insulated from the financial consequences of their decisions, incentives for cost discipline and careful cost-benefit evaluation are diminished. The Commission should be responsible for the costs of operating the regulatory infrastructure that it requires and relies upon.
Today’s proposal is designed to address the existing structural deficiencies by rescinding Rule 613, replacing the existing NMS plan reporting framework with a Commission rule, and facilitating the transfer of CAT governance to the Commission. The Commission also anticipates funding CAT operations through Congressional appropriations, subjecting these expenditures to the same budgetary discipline and oversight that applies to other Commission activities. The proposed approach would better align the authority to make decisions about the CAT with responsibility for the costs of those decisions.
Many thanks to the Division of Trading and Markets, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, the Office of General Counsel, and others at the Commission for their thoughtful work on this proposal. I also thank the SROs and other market participants for their considerable efforts in developing and operating the CAT.
The question is not whether regulators should have access to an effective consolidated audit trail—it is whether the current structure is the most accountable and efficient way to operate one. Importantly, the proposal would preserve the CAT’s core regulatory functionality while establishing a more sustainable and accountable framework for its future operation. For these reasons, I am pleased to support the proposal and look forward to commenters’ views on how the Commission can best improve the CAT’s governance and funding.
“Much of the increases are due to changing demands for information and access.”